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Financial Benchmark Control as Monopoly 
Power 
 




Financial benchmarks control the price of an underlying asset.  
Control of price may evidence monopolization.  This article examines 
financial benchmarks as currently utilized in financial markets, 
explains how financial benchmarks control price, establishes that 
financial benchmarks control price and explores United States 
antitrust law as it relates to monopolization by control of price.  
Additionally, this article extrapolates from the above issues of 
monopolization financial benchmark reform viability. 
As used in this article, a benchmark is defined as: prices, rates, 
indices or figures that are: a) Made available to users, whether free of 
charge or on payment; b) Calculated periodically, entirely or partially 
by the application of a formula or another method of calculation to, 
or an assessment of the value of, one or more underlying assets, prices 
or certain other data, including estimated prices, rates or other values, 
or surveys; and c) Used for reference for purposes that include one or 
more of the following: determining the interest payable, or other 
sums due, under loan agreements or under other financial contracts 
or instruments; determining the price at which a financial instrument 
may be bought or sold or traded or redeemed, or the value of a 
financial instrument; and/or measuring the performance of a 
financial instrument.1 
The financial benchmarks discussed in this article include 
financial market benchmarks, such as interest rate benchmarks, 
foreign exchange benchmarks and certain commodity market 
 
* Leflar Law Professor, University of Arkansas School of Law. The author would like to 
thank the University of Arkansas School of Law for the generous grant provided for this 
paper. 
 1. Consultation Report, Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’ns, Financial Benchmarks: Onnig 
H. Dombalagian, Chasing the Tape: Information Law and Policy In Capital Markets (89 
(2015) CR01/13, January 2013, at Annex A, p. 48), 
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD399.pdf. 
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benchmarks.  Major financial market benchmarks set prices in those 
markets and, hence, exert significant market power.  While financial 
benchmark abuse through manipulation undermines market 
integrity, it is important to understand that financial benchmarks do 
serve important functions in financial markets provided they are not 
manipulated. 
Financial benchmarks are important for setting price in financial 
markets because, when properly applied, they reduce costs and risks 
thus enhancing efficiency.  As discussed in section II, it would be 
impossible to quickly determine the real market price for many 
financial products due to the vast size and complexity of many of 
these markets.  Accordingly, this article does not argue for the 
elimination of financial benchmarks, but rather a more aggressive use 
of existing antitrust laws to provide a sufficient negative incentive to 
financial benchmark manipulation. 
Even if financial benchmarks are free from manipulation, it is 
important to understand that financial benchmarks are not objective; 
there is a fallible human factor involved.  This is important because 
we should not be led to believe that financial benchmarks impart 
information using an infallible mathematical methodology based 
purely on impartial data.  As discussed in section III, the human 
factor can intercede at various stages in the production of financial 
benchmarks.  Unregulated or underregulated financial benchmarks 
allows for increased human error and manipulation at the data input 
stage, the administrator stage and the end user stage. 
To further explain the human factor in financial benchmark 
production, section IV discusses how financial benchmarks are 
calculated using examples from the electricity market, the financial 
benchmark for interest rates, the foreign exchange market, the 
derivative swaps market and the brent crude oil market.  These 
examples are used in this paper because they involve financial 
benchmarks that were manipulated resulting in antitrust litigation 
which have provided us with several important case studies. 
Having explained how financial benchmarks work, section V 
establishes that financial benchmarks determine price in many 
markets.  Financial benchmarks are ubiquitous in setting prices in 
financial markets.  This is the economic reality of these markets, in 
part, because of legal requirements that financial benchmarks be 
used, regulatory requirements that financial benchmarks be used and 
adhesion contracts that incorporate financial benchmarks.  
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Accordingly, prices in these markets are controlled by financial 
benchmarks. 
This price control factor is critical because the ability to control 
price is one of the necessary elements to establish monopolization 
under the Sherman Act, §2.  Section VI explains monopolization as 
having two critical elements; 1.  Monopoly power which is the ability 
to control prices or eliminate competitors and 2.  The conduct prong 
which has been described as anticompetitive conduct. Financial 
benchmark monopolization cases are examined here to illustrate how 
control of the financial benchmark equals the ability to control prices 
and how financial benchmark manipulation establishes a violation of 
the conduct prong. 
Finally, section VII examines some of the financial benchmark 
reforms, with a particular focus on interest rate benchmarks.  The 
purpose here is to illustrate how, even with reforms, the human factor 
will be ever present in financial benchmarks. 
 
II. WHY FINANCIAL BENCHMARKS ARE IMPORTANT 
 
Financial markets2 are enormous consisting of investments in the 
trillions of dollars.3  The buying and selling of these investment 
vehicles, of necessity, requires the establishment of prices. But how 
does one efficiently establish “price” in such large markets? Fair 
market value has, since ancient times, been considered a just price 
most buyers and sellers would agree to.4  But it would be impractical 
to attempt to establish a fair market price in such “vast and complex” 
markets.5 Enter financial benchmarks, a pricing mechanism that looks 
at data from a sample of the market in question and applies that data 
to a mathematical formula to calculate an estimated “fair market” 
price. 
 
 2. Adam Hayes, Financial Markets, INVESTOPDIA (Feb. 23, 2021), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/financial-
market.asp#:~:text=Financial%20markets%20refer%20broadly%20to,smooth%20operati
on%20of%20capitalist%20economies (In this paper, financial markets refer broadly to any 
marketplace where the trading of securities occurs, including the stock market, bond 
market, commodities market, forex market, and derivatives market, among others.). 
 3. Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Benchmark Regulation, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1929, 1930-31 (2017). 
 4. Alphonse M. Squillante, The Doctrine of Just Price-Its Origin and Development, 
74 COM L.J., (Nov. 1969), 333 (citing to ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS, (Penguin Classics edition), 
261). 
 5. Andrew Verstein, Benchmark Manipulation, 56 B.C. L. REV. 215, 217 (2015). 
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Financial benchmarks are important to financial markets because 
they reduce transaction costs as parties do not have to compile their 
own price data,6 increase the disbursement of information,7 and 
enhance market transparency and liquidity.8  These benefits reduce 
barriers to entry, simplify transactions and increase efficiency. 9  
Today, the economic reality is that actual fair market prices are 
irrelevant in many markets; benchmarks determine price.10 
 
III. THE HUMAN FACTOR - BENCHMARKS ARE NOT 
OBJECTIVE 
 
Similar to the myth of the “rational man,” benchmarks persist in 
a mythical world of objective mathematical data.11 Before the 2012 
revelation of benchmark manipulation, the subjective, human 
elements, including avarice, have been ignored leaving benchmarks 
to exist in an unregulated environment.12 
While benchmarks may be calculated using different 
methodologies, discussed in more detail below, all benchmarks have 
three key actors: input providers, benchmark administrators and end 
users.13  Each of these actors rely as much, if not more, on human 
factors rather than a pure, mathematical factor.  For example, input 
providers provide the data upon which the benchmark is based.  The 
greater the number of input providers, the more accurate the 
benchmark and the less likely the benchmark can be manipulated.14  
But data input is not a simple bean-count; as with all data-based 
information bad data results in bad information – garbage-in, 
 
 6. Fletcher, supra note 3, at 1943-44; Verstein supra note 5 at 225-27; Gabriel 
Rauterberg, Andrew Verstein, Index Theory: The Law, Promise and Failure of Financial Indices, 
30 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 13, 14 (2013). 
 7. Rauterberg, supra note 6, at 13; Fletcher supra note 3, at 1943-44; Verstein supra 
note 5, at 225-26; Vincent Brousseau et al., The LIBOR Scandal: What’s Next? A Possible Way 
Forward, VOX (Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.voxeu.org/article/libor-scandal-and-reform. 
 8. Fletcher, supra note 3, at 1943-44; Rauterberg, supra note 6, at 13. 
 9. Fletcher, supra note 3, at 1944; Rauterberg, supra note 6, at 14. 
 10. Verstein, supra note 5, at 217; Fletcher, supra note 3, at 1943. 
 11. Rauterberg, supra note 6, at 15. 
 12. Fletcher, supra note 3, at 1933; Rauterberg, supra note 6, at 3. 
 13. Fletcher, supra note 3, at 1945. 
 14. Id.; see also Consultation Report,  Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’ns, Financial 
Benchmarks: Onnig H. Dombalagian, Chasing the Tape: Information Law and Policy In 
Capital Markets (89 (2015) CR01/13, January 2013, at Annex A, p. 12), 
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD399.pdf. 
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garbage-out.15  For example, the data that used to be submitted to 
calculate LIBOR16 was based upon input providers’ “estimates.”  This 
data source was not purely mathematical, and in turn, it allowed for 
significant discretion as well as manipulation.17 
To some extent, benchmarks are compiled based upon decision 
theory:18 selecting segments of data because using the entire universe 
of data is not practical primarily due to costs.  This requires some 
subjective intervention.19  For example, Platts provides oil price data 
based upon actual transactions.  However, Platts does not contact 
every buyer and seller of oil.  Rather, it uses a market sample selecting 
who to contact, how to weigh the data, and estimates when data is 
not available.  Such data input is inherently subjective.20 
There are two types of benchmark administrators: private 
service benchmark administrators who provide output date to clients 
who subscribe to their service and secondary business sources such 
as exchanges and trade organizations. 21  In both instances, 
benchmark administrators select data sources, gather the data from 
input providers, determine weights to be assigned to data inputs, 
calculate the data inputs and disseminate the resulting outputs 
(benchmark price) to end users.22  As with data input, this selection of 
data process together with weighting considerations and 
methodologies require some subjective human input. 
End users are parties who need the information to reduce 
transaction costs.  In the financial services sector, this would include 
large actors in financial markets such as banks, insurance companies, 
 
 15. TechTarget Contributor, Definition garbage in, garbage out (GIGO), 
SEARCHSOFTWARE QUALITY (2008), 
https://searchsoftwarequality.techtarget.com/definition/garbage-in-garbage-out 
(George Fuechsel, an early computer programmer and instructor, is believed to have 
coined the term as a visual tool in teaching his students that a computer just processes 
what it is given.). 
 16. London Inter-bank Offered Rate. 
 17. Rauterberg, supra note 6, at 17. 
 18. See Herbert A. Simon, Theories of Decision-Making in Economics and Behavioral 
Science, 49(3) THE AMERICAN ECON. REV. 253, 272-73 (June, 1959) (In this paper, decision 
theory is meant to describe the use of selective information when using all possible 
information would be impracticable.). 
 19. Rauterberg, supra note 6, at 18-19. 
 20. Id. at 24. 
 21. Fletcher, supra note 3, at 1946. 
 22. Fletcher, supra note 3, at 1946; Consultation Report,  Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’ns, 
Financial Benchmarks: Onnig H. Dombalagian, Chasing the Tape: Information Law and 
Policy In Capital Markets (89 (2015) CR01/13, January 2013, at Annex A, p. 15), 
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD399.pdf. 
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and hedge funds.23  Such end users reduce pricing transaction costs 
by referencing price to a benchmark rather than trying to set price on 
actual market prices; a costly endeavor. 
Price benchmarks are generally easier to manipulate than the 
prices they represent. Two factors—concentration and 
voluntariness—greatly influence the potential for bias. Concentration 
reflects the fact that benchmark data is only a slice of all available data 
for that particular benchmark.24  As discussed above regarding the oil 
benchmark, Platts, only a small percentage of actual transactions are 
used as the data input.  Accordingly, the data input is concentrated.  
This is referred to as domain concentration where the input providers 
are limited to a small number.  If there are only a few buyers and 
sellers in a market, this is referred to as participant concentration.  
Finally, liquidity concentration occurs when there are few trades 
within a market.  Participant and liquidity concentration are related 
to the end user actors.  All three forms of concentration can skew the 
benchmark to the point where we are not receiving information about 
market prices, but instead, we are receiving a benchmark price which 
may have very little to do with a free-market price.25 
While the above description of benchmarks identifies three 
separate actors, it is often the case that the input providers and the 
end users are the same party.26  For example, in the LIBOR 
benchmark, input providers and end users were banks who needed 
the benchmark to set the price for interest rates.27  To further add to 
the conflict of interest, the benchmark administrator for LIBOR was 
the BBA, a banking trade association.28 
 
IV. HOW BENCHMARKS ARE CALCULATED 
 
Benchmarks use a variety of input mechanisms and 
mathematical formulas to determine a price or a rate for underlying 
assets.29  This section examines the various mechanisms used to create 
 
 23. Fletcher, supra note 3, at 1945. 
 24. Andrew Verstein, Benchmark Manipulation, 56 B.C. L. REV. 215, 218 (2015). 
 25. Id. at 230-31. 
 26. Fletcher, supra note 3, at 1945. 
 27. Sharon E. Foster, LIBOR Manipulation and Antitrust Allegations, 11 DEPAUL BUS. & 
COM. L.J. 291, 296-97 (2013). 
 28. Foster, supra note 27, at 296-97; Fletcher, supra note 26, at 1945, 1960. 
 29. Fletcher, supra note 3 at 1930-31, 1945-46; Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on Market Abuse [Market Abuse 
Regulation], L 173/1 OJ 12.06.2014, recital (29); Gabriel Rauterberg & Andrew Verstein, 
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a pricing benchmark in the electricity market, interest rates, the 
foreign exchange market, the derivative swaps market, and the brent 
crude oil market.  Each of these markets have experienced benchmark 
manipulation indicating that various benchmark calculations have 
vulnerabilities. 
 
A. BENCHMARK CALCULATION IN THE ELECTRICITY MARKET 
  
 In the Merced30 case, the California electricity price benchmark 
was calculated as follows: 
 
“A. THE ELECTRICITY MARKET 
. . . Merced purchased peak electricity from another 
California irrigation district during the Class Period. Those 
contracts settled according to the Dow Jones Daily Index 
price for peak power at the northern California trading hub 
known as North Path 15, which is set by averaging market 
prices for electricity-related contracts at North Path 15. . .. 
Two types of electricity-related contracts are relevant 
to this case: contracts for next-day delivery of physical 
electricity, or “dailies,” and financial “swap” contracts by 
which parties agree to exchange payments depending on the 
daily index price on a specified settlement date at a specified 
location. The prices at which dailies and swap contracts 
settle are based on the index price published by certain 
exchanges. 
Those exchanges calculate index prices based on 
transactions for electricity at specific trading locations. One 
of these exchanges is the Intercontinental Exchange 
(“ICE”), which calculates a Daily Index price based on the 
weighted average price of all day-ahead fixed-price physical 
electricity transactions at the relevant location. Dow Jones 
also calculates prices based on the same dates and trading 
hub locations, which Merced alleges move in lockstep with 
the ICE Daily Index price (collectively with the ICE Daily 
Index price, the “Daily Index Prices”). Market participants 
 
Index Theory: The Law, Promise and Failure of Financial Indices, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 17-24 
(2013). 
 30. Merced Irrigation District v. Barclays Bank PLC, 165 F.Supp.3d 122 (S.D.N.Y., 
2016). 
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trading in physical positions have the obligation to deliver 
or receive electricity at the Daily Index Prices, while those 
trading in purely financial positions, including swap 
contracts, have no obligation to deliver or receive physical 
electricity. 
Although Barclays did not have the capability to 
provide or accept physical electricity, during the Class 
Period it traded both short-term contracts for physical 
electricity—which it then “flattened,” or offset, by 
purchasing or selling physical contracts for an equal volume 
of electricity in the opposite direction prior to delivery—and 
longer-term swap contracts that settled at prices set by the 
ICE Daily Index . . ..31 
 
The electricity market in Merced was priced based upon a 
benchmark known as the Dow Jones Daily Index for a particular 
geographic location, North Path 15.  Dow Jones Daily Index, in turn, 
calculates its index from input date received from various trading 
exchanges such as the Intercontinental Exchange (“ICE”).  ICE uses a 
weighted average price method to calculate price based upon actual 
transaction for a specific location.  Data is taken from actual 
transactions on the ICE trading platform from trades by ICE 
members.  So, the administrator and the data input providers are, in 
essence, the same.32  Further, the data input providers are the very 
people who become the end users. 
 
B. BENCHMARK CALCULATION FOR INTEREST RATES 
 
Regarding the LIBOR interest rate index, prior to 2012 the 
benchmarks were calculated as follows: 
[T]he British Bankers Association, which administered LIBOR 
from its inception and through the relevant time period, would have 
participating banks submit data in response to this question, “At 
what rate could you borrow funds, were you to do so by asking for 
and then accepting inter-bank offers in a reasonable market size just 
prior to 11 am?” The rates are calculated by participating banks 
submitting data on a daily basis reflecting their estimated cost of 
 
 31. Id. at 128-29. 
 32. Wholesale Electricity and Natural Gas Market Data (June 18, 2020), 
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/wholesale/. 
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money for fifteen different time periods; overnight loans up to 
twelve-month loans. Participating banks are on panels consisting of 
six to eighteen banks with some banks on more than one panel. There 
are a total of ten panels; one for each of the ten major currencies 
included in the LIBOR calculations. 
Banks are selected as participating banks on the panels based 
upon reputation, credit quality, and activity in London, as London is 
a major international financial market. The data provided by 
participating banks on a specific panel is then “trimmed” with the 
highest and lowest 25% rates eliminated, and the median rates used. 
For example, the U.S. Dollar LIBOR panel is comprised of eighteen 
participating banks which would submit data each day on each of the 
fifteen time periods. Looking at just one of those time periods for 
purposes of this example, say the overnight rate, of the eighteen data 
submissions, the high four and the low four would be eliminated with 
the middle remaining ten used to calculate the overnight interest rate 
for the U.S. Dollar LIBOR.33 
LIBOR is supposed to reflect the cost of money over various time 
periods.  It was based upon estimates provided by a limited number 
of banks (data input providers) who were also end users.  The 
administrator was a banking trade association. 
 
C. BENCHMARK CALCULATION IN THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET 
 
As for the foreign exchange market, the benchmarks were 
calculated as follows: 
The FOREX case involved the manipulation of foreign exchange 
(FX) benchmark rates. FX benchmark rates are used to price certain 
foreign exchange financial transactions including foreign exchange 
swaps, cross currency swaps, spot transactions, futures, options, 
forwards and other derivatives. In general, FX benchmark rates are 
set based upon actual trades (bids and offers during the “fix period” 
(a one-minute window). The benchmark rate is determined by 
calculating the bid-offer spread based upon the fix period 
information and calculating a median which determines the rate.34 
Unlike LIBOR, foreign exchange data input was based upon 
actual trades, but only during a short time period.  This data was 
 
 33. Foster, supra note 27, at 296-96. 
 34. Sharon E. Foster, Antitrust Efficient Enforcer and the Financial Products Benchmark 
Manipulation Litigation, 13 OHIO ST. BUS.L.J. 99, 144-45 (2019). 
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manipulated by not submitting trades during the fix period or 
submitting as many trades as possible during the fix period.  The data 
input providers and end users were the same people. 
 
D. BENCHMARK CALCULATION IN THE DERIVATIVE SWAPS MARKET 
 
An interest rate benchmark for swaps known as the ISDAfix was 
calculated as follows: 
The ISDAfix is an interest rate benchmark, issued in several 
currencies, used to price interest rate swaps. For example, one party 
may hold a financial instrument with a fixed interest rate while 
another party holds a financial instrument with a floating interest 
rate. These parties may enter into an agreement to swap 
fixed/floating interest rates. A “swaption,” is an option to enter into 
an interest rate swap at a specified rate on some set future date. The 
ISDAfix is the benchmark used to price these interest rate swaps. 
USD ISDAfix rates and spreads are U.S. Dollar-denominated 
swaps for various maturity dates. The 11:00 a.m. USD rate is used for 
cash settlement of swaps and swaptions. The USD ISDAfix rate was 
set by a process that began at 11:00 am Eastern Time by capturing 
swap rates and spreads from U.S. based Swap Brokers. ICAP Plc, 
responsible for compiling ISDAfix benchmark rates data during the 
relevant time period, would circulate to a panel of banks and financial 
institutions (collectively “banks”) a set of reference points generated 
using the captured data and data reflecting executed trades and 
executable bids and offers at 11:00 am for US Treasury securities. 
ICAP requested the banks to submit the midpoint of where it would 
offer and bid a swap to a dealer. Banks could accept the reference rate 
provided at 11:02 a.m., submit a different value, or take no action. 
Thomson Reuters would then average the submissions resulting in 
the USD ISDAfix.35 
The USD ISDAfix price sought data input from end users during 
a brief time period, from a limited number of data input providers 
who could provide data not based on actual market conditions and 
then accept, reject or take no action based on that data which was then 
averaged by the administrator. 
 
E. BENCHMARK CALCULATION IN THE BRENT CRUDE OIL MARKET 
 
 
 35. Id. at 148. 
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Benchmark calculation for the Brent Crude Oil index is as 
follows: 
The cash settlement price for the ICE Brent Future is based on the 
ICE Brent Index (‘The Index’) on expiry day for the relevant ICE Brent 
Futures contract month. The Index represents the average price of 
trading in the BFOE (Brent-Forties-Oseberg-Ekofisk-Troll) cash or 
forward (‘BFOE Cash’) market in the relevant delivery month as 
reported and confirmed by the industry media. Only published cargo 
size (600,000 barrels) trades and assessments are taken into 




The calculation of the ICE Brent Index will be the average of five 
values. These will be aggregated into a single figure for the final ICE 
Brent Index figure from the five standalone valuations at each of the 
sampling points. 
Each of those five figures will be calculated by averaging the sum 
of: 
1) The volume weighted minute marker for the second month 
ICE Brent Futures contract at the sampling time; and the sum of a 
weighted average of full cargo second month EFP trades and a 
weighted average of full cargo spread trades (between first and 
second months) in the Cash BFOE market, in the 30-minute period 
concluding at the sampling point in question; and 
2) that same volume weighted minute marker to the sum of the 
straight averages of the independent assessment(s) specified in the 
Index methodology for the second month EFP value and the spread 
between the first and second month Cash BFOE markets at the 
sampling point; and 
3) a weighted average of any full cargo first month Cash BFOE 
trades (if any) in the 5-minute period concluding at the sampling 
point in question. 
Should trades occur in only one of the component markets of 
section 1 above, the missing trade- derived value will be replaced in 
the calculation above by an independent assessment of that 
component market at that time, but only where no trade in that 
component market has occurred. 
Should trades occur in neither component market during the 30-
minute period in question, then the value for that sampling time will 
 
 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL 17:2 244 
be calculated as per paragraphs 2 and 3 only, i.e., on the basis of 
independent assessments and any full cash cargoes only. 
Should no trades occur in component market 3, then the value 
for that sampling time will be calculated as per paragraph 1 and 2 
only, i.e. on the basis of independent assessments and/or any EFP 
and/or spread trade only. 
 
ii. Volume Weighted Second Month Minute Markers 
 
Tradable minute markers will exist for the second month ICE 
Brent Crude Futures contract at the following sampling times: 10:30, 
12:30, 14:30, 16:30 and 19:30. Two of the second month minute 
markers already exist, which are calculated at 16:30 (the ‘tradable ICE 
Brent London Minute Marker’) and 19:30 (settlement). Please note, 
the 19:30 marker is a two-minute marker. 
 
iii. Full Cargo Second Month Efp Trades And Full Cargo Spread 
Trades (Between First And Second Months) 
 
For inclusion in the Index calculation, the full cargo EFP must be 
traded in the 30 minutes before the sample time, so 10:00:00 to 
10:29:59 for the 10:30 sampling point, 12:00:00 to 12:29:59 for the 12:30 
sampling point and so forth. If the cargo trades any time after 10:30 
or 12:30 and so forth, it will not be included in the Index calculation. 
If the trade appears to be close to the cut-off, the Exchange will reach 
out to participants on one or both sides, and/or to brokers to clarify 
when the trade actually occurred. 
 
iv. Independent Assessments 
 
ICIS assess the M2 EFP and M1/M2 Cash BFOE Spread at 10:30, 
12:30, 14:30, 16:30 and 19:30 on expiry day. These independent 
assessments of the M2 EFP and M1/M2 Cash BFOE Spread are used 
in the calculation of the Brent Index. 
 
v. First Month Cash Bfoe Trades 
 
To be included in the Brent Index, full cargo front month cargo 
trades must happen within 5 minutes of the cut-off time. These are at: 
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10:25:00 to 10:29:59, 12:25:00 to 12:29:59, 14:25:00 to 14:29:59, 16:25:00 
to 16:29:59 and 19:25:00 to 19:29:59.36 
What is clear from the rather complex methodology used to 
calculate the brent oil benchmark is that it is an average of five values.  
These five values represent the data input looking at volume during 
a two-month time period, price during a thirty-minute time period 
and a weighted average during a five-minute time period.  When data 
is missing, independent assessment is used in lieu of actual market 
data.  With the exception of the independent assessment, data input 
providers and end users are the same. 
 
V. BENCHMARKS DETERMINE PRICE 
 
It has been argued that even with benchmarks one can negotiate 
price.37  If one can negotiate price, it is not likely that a party has 
control of price.  However, this theoretical possibility is not a realistic 
probability as most markets are priced by benchmarks.38  Indeed, not 
only are financial benchmarks used in most contracts to price 
financial products,39 they are required under accounting standards 
and regulations for disclosure requirements.40  Thus, it seems unlikely 
 
 36. ICE Futures Europe, The ICE Brent Index (date, time), 
https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/futures/ICE_Futures_Europe_Brent_Index.pdf. 
 37. See Gelboim v. Bank of America, 823 F.3d 759, 773 (2nd Cir. 2016). 
 38. Verstein, supra note 24, at 224-25. 
 39. Matthew C. Turk, Regulation by Settlement, 66 U. KAN. L.R. 259, 284 (2017). 
 40. Fair Value Measurement topic 820 FASB: Ernst & Young, Financial reporting 




v2.pdf (last visited ...) ; Financial Accounting Standards Board, Proposed Accounting 
Standards Update: Financial Instruments—Credit Losses (Topic 326), Derivatives and 
Hedging (Topic 815), and Leases (Topic 842), 
https://www.fasb.org/cs/ContentServer?c=FASBContent_C&cid=1176173177588&d=&
pagename=FASB%2FFASBContent_C%2FGeneralContentDisplay (last visited…); 
Warren Gorham & Lamont, FASB Updates List of Permissible U.S. Benchmark Interest 
Rates for Hedge Accounting, Bank Auditing and Accounting Report (November 2018), 
2018 WL 6444909; ASU 2018-16, Derivatives and Hedging (Topic 815): Inclusion of the 
Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR) Overnight Index Swap (OIS) Rate as a 
Benchmark Interest Rate for Hedge Accounting Purposes; 17 C.F.R. § 229.1111; Fletcher, 
supra note 26, at 1943; Warren Gorham & Lamont International Accounting and Financial 
Reporting, and Analysis, WGL INTLACCT B25; Harold S. Bloomenthal & Samuel Wolff, 
Securities Law Handbook | June 2020 Update, Chapter 3. The Integrated Disclosure System, 
Part II. Regulation S-K, D. Other Disclosures, § 3:78. The LIBOR transition. 
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that one could negotiate price if the financial benchmark was 
required for accounting and regulatory purposes. 
Pricing benchmarks have become “the de facto pricing 
mechanism for many markets.”41 
Given risk factors and costs in trying to incorporate “real” 
market prices, for regulatory purposes such as accounting standards 
or into financial product contracts pricing benchmarks have become 
ubiquitous as pricing terms.42 
 
A. LEGAL AND REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS TO USE BENCHMARKS 
 
There are numerous instances where the use of pricing 
benchmarks are legally required.  As one scholar noted: 
 
The law often imposes benchmarks upon private 
actors, publicly endorsing private hardwiring. It is 
common for regulations to require private actors to 
use benchmarks. For example, exchange traded funds 
obtain broad exemptions from the regulations 
applicable to mutual funds, provided that they are 
based upon a third-party benchmark; . . . ; ERISA 
conditions the ability of fiduciaries to self-deal in 
currency trades for the retirement plans they 
supervise on limiting their prices by the relevant 
benchmark; federal law requires natural gas prices to 
be “fair and reasonable,” but prices linked to a market 
benchmark are presumptively valid.43 
 
To add to the above list, the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (“FASB”) promulgates accounting standards considered 
 
 41. John B. Kirkwood, Market Power and Antitrust Enforcement, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1169, 
1178-79; 1181-85 (2018); Fletcher, supra note 3, at 1930, 1943-44; Matthew C. Turk, 
Regulation by Settlement, 66 U. KAN. L.R. 259, 284 (2017); Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on Market Abuse [Market 
Abuse Regulation or ‘MAR’], L 173/1 OJ 12.06.2014, recital (29); Verstein, supra note 24, at 
217, 236; Vincent Brousseau et al., The LIBOR Scandal: What’s Next? A Possible Way Forward, 
VOX (Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.voxeu.org/article/libor-scandal-and-reform. 
 42. Verstein, supra note 24, at 224-25. 
 43. Id. at 227-28; see Reforming Major Interest Rate Benchmarks, Progress Report (18 
December 2019), p. 41, https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P181219.pdf 
(discussing the OSSG working to ease the transition from LIBOR to SOFR taking into 
account regulatory issues where benchmarks are required). 
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authoritative by state and national accounting regulators such as the 
American Institute of CPAs (AICPA).44  The FASB defines benchmark 
interest rates as: 
 
Benchmark Interest Rate 
A widely recognized and quoted rate in an active 
financial market that is broadly indicative of the overall level 
of interest rates attributable to high-credit-quality obligors 
in that market. It is a rate that is widely used in a given 
financial market as an underlying basis for determining the 
interest rates of individual financial instruments and 
commonly referenced in interest-rate-related transactions. 
In theory, the benchmark interest rate should be a risk-
free rate (that is, has no risk of default). In some markets, 
government borrowing rates may serve as a benchmark. In 
other markets, the benchmark interest rate may be an 
interbank offered rate.45 
 
This definition sets interest rate prices by defining interest rates 
based upon a benchmark.  Additionally, a list of approved interest 
rate benchmarks is provided by FASB.46  Further, the capital asset 
pricing model (“CAPM”), an accounting model used to price risky 
securities, incorporates “risk-free rates” which include the proposed 
benchmark SOFR and LIBOR (a risk-free proxy rate).47 
Further, the Securities and Exchange Commission requires “a 
consistent comparison of composites to appropriate benchmarks” for 
 
 44. FASB Updates List of Permissible U.S. Benchmark Interest Rates for Hedge 
Accounting (last visited Oct. 25, 2018), 
https://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/FASBContent_C/NewsPage&cid=1176171490795. 
 45. FASB Accounting Standards Update, Derivatives and Hedging (Topic 815): 
Inclusion of the Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR) Overnight Index Swap (OIS) Rate as 
a Benchmark Interest Rate for Hedge Accounting Purposes, No. 2018-16 (Oct. 2018), 
https://asc.fasb.org/imageRoot/47/118700447.pdf. 
 46. FASB Updates List of Permissible U.S. Benchmark Interest Rates for Hedge 
Accounting (Oct. 25, 2018), 
https://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/FASBContent_C/NewsPage&cid=1176171490795. 
 47. Andreas Schrimpf & Vladyslav Sushko, Beyond LIBOR: A Primer on the New 
Benchmark Rates, BIS Q. REV. 29, 30 (Mar. 5, 2019), 
https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1903e.htm; Will Kenton, Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM), INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 1, 2021), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/capm.asp; Adam Hayes, LIBOR Curve, 
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performance advertising.48  The New York Federal Reserve has 
established the Alternative Reference Rate Committee (“ARRC”) to 
ease the transition from LIBOR to SOFR because the LIBOR 
benchmark is widely used and legally required relating to financial 
market accounting requirements and tax issues.49 
 
B. CONTRACTS INCORPORATING BENCHMARKS AS PRICE INPUTS 
 
Given the previously noted risk factors and costs in attempting 
to price based upon the “real” market price together with legal and 
regulatory requirements to use benchmarks, benchmarks have 
become a common pricing term in many financial products 
contracts.50  While, theoretically some parties may have some choice 
about pricing terms, as a practical reality there is little to no choice 
due to legal requirements to use certain benchmarks as discussed 
above and contract of adhesion issues discussed below.  The result is 
that the benchmark incorporated in the contract constitutes price.51 
Perhaps the most concerning aspect regarding benchmark 
manipulation is the impact it had on retirement investment funds as 
these retirement accounts are largely an adhesion contract which 
reference a benchmark for price.52  An adhesion contract is generally 
defined as: 
Contracts of adhesion are characterized by standardized forms 
prepared by one party which are offered for rejection or acceptance 
without opportunity for bargaining and under the circumstances that 
the second party cannot obtain the desired product or service except 
by acquiescing in the form agreement.53 
A typical retirement plan, such as a 401k, allows employees to 
contribute to an employer-determined set of assets which may 
 
 48. See SEC Compliance Alert (June 2007), 
https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/complialert.htm. 
 49. Reforming Major Interest Rate Benchmarks, Progress Report, 43-44 (Dec. 18, 
2019), https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P181219.pdf. 
 50. Verstein, supra note 24, at 226. 
 51. Verstein, supra note 24, at 228; Rauterberg & Verstein, supra note 29, at 9-11. 
 52. Verstein, supra note 24, at 236. 
 53. Rory v. Continental Ins. Co., 473, Mich. 457, 484 (2005) (citing to Morris v. 
Metriyakool, 
418 Mich. 423 (1984); Patterson v. ITT Consumer Financial Corp., 14 Cal. App. 1659, 1664 
(1993); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. 
REV. 1173, 1177 (1983); Kenneth R. Davis, The Arbitration Claws: Unconscionability In The 
Securities Industry, 78 BOST. U. L. REV. 255, 284-85 (1998). 
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include mutual funds, bonds, stocks and real estate investment 
trusts.54  Accordingly, the employee has no choice as to what funds 
are in the plan, the employer does.  The employee does get to direct 
her contributions to specific funds within the plan.  Critically, 401k 
plans and IRAs are considered ERISA plans which are deemed to be 
adhesion contracts.55 
Financial products, such as mutual funds, are a primary 
investment instrument included in retirement accounts, such as the 
401k retirement accounts or IRAs.  These retirement vehicles account 
for a significant portion of U.S. financial markets.  For example: 
Employer-sponsored retirement plans (DB [Defined Benefit 
plans such as pensions] and DC plans [Defined Contribution plans 
such as 401(k) and 403(b) plans] sponsored by private-sector and 
government employers), IRAs (including rollovers), and annuities 
play an important role in the US retirement system, with assets 
totaling $27.1 trillion at year-end 2018 . . . down 4.7 percent from year-
end 2017, but in line with the 5.3 percent decline in US stocks during 
the year. The largest components of retirement assets were IRAs and 
employer-sponsored DC plans, which together represented 60 
percent of all retirement market assets at year-end 2018. Other 
employer-sponsored plans include private-sector DB pension plans 
($2.9 trillion), state and local government DB retirement plans ($3.9 
trillion), and federal government DB plans ($1.8 trillion) . . ..56 
Many US households have accumulated resources earmarked 
for retirement . . .. Across all age groups, 62 percent of US households 
(79 million) reported that they had employer-sponsored retirement 
plans, IRAs, or both in 2018. Fifty-six percent of US households 
reported that they had employer-sponsored retirement plans—that 
is, they had assets in DC plan accounts, were receiving or expecting 
to receive benefits from DB plans, or both. Thirty-three percent 
reported having assets in IRAs, including 27 percent who had both 
IRAs and employer-sponsored retirement plans. US households 
represent a wide range of ages at different points in the life cycle of 
 
 54. Joshua Kennon, Investing Through Your 401(k): A Beginner’s Guide to the Different 
Types of 401(k) Plans, THE BALANCE (Feb. 9, 2021), 
https://www.thebalance.com/investing-through-your-401-k-357109. 
 55. Kate Watson Moss, ERISA and Arbitration: How Safe Is Your 401(k)?, 64 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 773, 780-81 and fn 68, 804 and fn 264 (2015); 29 U.S.C. Chapt. 18 Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (ERISA), https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-
review/vol64/iss2/22. 
 56. 2019 Investment Company Handbook: A Review of Trends and Activities in the 
Investment Company Industry, 158, https://www.ici.org/pdf/2019_factbook.pdf. 
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savings. Focus on retirement savings tends to increase with age . . ., 
and older households are more likely to have retirement resources; 
for example, about eight out of 10 near-retiree households have 
retirement accumulations . . ..57 
Retirement plans contain trillions of dollars which retirees and 
soon to be retirees depend upon for their retirement.  Social Security 
is not intended to and does not pay enough to live on.  Further, it is 
anyone’s guess if Social Security will be available in the not-too-
distant future. 
The above-described retirement plans are contracts of adhesion 
where the investor has limited options regarding the investment 
vehicles, limited options regarding the amount of contribution and 
no choice regarding pricing benchmarks.  Even if negotiations for 
pricing benchmarks were possible for retirement accounts, it is 
doubtful that individual investors would have the time to spend 
researching such things as pricing benchmarks in order to make an 
informed choice for purposes of negotiations.  Indeed, it would 
probably be terribly inefficient to institute such individual 





Pricing benchmarks are, as a matter of economic reality, price in 
most financial markets.  Control a pricing benchmark for a market 
often means control of price for that market.  If the pricing benchmark 
has few input providers or is otherwise concentrated, uses a 
methodology that is easily manipulated or utilizes input providers, 
administrators and/or end users with conflicts of interest there is a 
high risk the pricing benchmark will be manipulated for 
anticompetitive purposes.  Such control and manipulation may also 
be monopolization; an antitrust violation. 
The primary statute dealing with monopolization is the Sherman 
Act, 15 U.S.C. §2 which states, in pertinent part: 
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, 
or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to 
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several 
 
 57. Id. at 159. 
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States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, . . 
..58 
The Supreme Court has articulated a two-prong test to establish 
a Sherman Act §2 claim of monopolization: “(1) the possession of 
monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition 
or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or 
development as a consequence of a superior product, business 
acumen, or historic accident.”59 
The first prong of the Sherman Act §2 test is “monopoly power,” 
which the Supreme Court has defined as “the power to control prices 
or exclude competition.”60  Additionally, the Supreme Court has held 
that such price control must be of a sufficient duration to avoid 
interfering in a market that will self-correct.61  The second prong of 
Sherman §2, “willful acquisition or maintenance of that power” is the 
conduct prong and examines what defendants allegedly did to 
monopolize or attempt to monopolize.  This prong primarily seeks to 
identify exclusionary, predatory or anticompetitive conduct that 
violates the conduct prong.62  For example, below-cost prices that 
drive rivals out of the market and allow the monopolist to raise its 
prices later and recoup its losses; limited circumstances in which a 
firm’s unilateral refusal to deal with its rivals can give rise to antitrust 
liability; tying arrangements where a firm requires a customer to 
purchase a tied product in order to purchase the tying product; 
fraudulent patent procurement; acquisition of competitors; and 
restrictive agreements.63 These examples are illustrative and do not 
 
 58. 15 U.S.C. §2. 
 59. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); Brunswick Corp v. 
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977) (In a civil Sherman §2 claim must also 
establish damages of the type antitrust law was intended to address, but damage issues 
are not discussed in this article.). 
 60. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956). 
 61. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589-90 (1986). 
 62. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline, 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1120 (2009); Brooke Group Ltd. v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 (1993); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen 
Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 602-03 (1985); Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum 
Co., 495 U.S. 328, 340 (1990). 
 63. Pac. Bell Tel., 129 S. Ct. at 1118 (citing Brooke Group, Ltd., 509 U.S. at 222-24 and 
Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 608-11); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 
504 U.S. 451, 482-83 (1992) (holding that the issue of whether Kodak engaged in 
monopolistic behavior when it limited private-service companies’ access to replacement 
parts turned on whether Kodak had valid business justifications for its activity); Walker 
Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177-78 (1965) (concerning 
allegations that a company misrepresented facts in an attempt to gain a patent); Standard 
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 75 (1911) (discussing whether a monopoly existed as 
a result of corporate combinations and stock transfers); and United States v. Grinnell 
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create an exhaustive list.64  Conduct that does not amount to market 
abuses, such as non-predatory price-cutting (where the price is not 
below costs), are not a violation of Sherman §2’s conduct prong as 
courts do not want to harm efficiency, risk taking and innovation.65 
In section A below, Monopoly Power, I discuss the traditional 
mechanisms to determine if defendant[s] control price – direct 
evidence and a market share analysis.  Generally, control of a pricing 
benchmark provides direct evidence of price control.  Additionally, 
the duration of control will be addressed.  In section B below, Willful 
Acquisition or Maintenance – The Conduct Prong, I explore how 
manipulation of a pricing benchmark satisfies the conduct prong of 
Sherman §2. 
 
A. MONOPOLY POWER 
 
The key to monopoly power is the power to control prices or 
eliminate competitors.66 
While this definition of monopoly power allows evidence of 
either the ability to control prices or conduct that eliminates 
competitors, both evidentiary factors relate to the same concern – a 
private party’s ability to artificially set prices rather than prices being 
 
Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 576 (1966) (considering restrictive agreements that preempted 
competition as a factor in determining whether a monopoly existed). 
 64. Verizon Commn’cs, Inc. v. Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P., 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004) (citing 
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam)). 
 65. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594, 602-03 
(1986) (discussing how cutting prices is a common way to increase business and is at the 
core of competition; id. (“[W]e must be concerned lest a rule or precedent that authorizes 
a search for a particular type of undesirable pricing behavior end up by discouraging 
legitimate price competition.”) (quoting Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 
F.2d 227, 234 (1st Cir. 1983) (internal citation marks omitted); see also Brooke Groupe Ltd. 
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 226 (1993) (citing Cargill, Inc. v. 
Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 121 n.17 (1986)) (referencing the chilling effect that 
mistaking price cuts to increase business for predatory pricing may have on competition); 
Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328. 340 (1990) (stating that low prices 
benefit customers and, as long as they are not predatory, do not threaten competition); 
Pac. Bell Tel., 129 S. Ct. at 1118 (citing United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 
(1919)); but see Verizon Commc’ns Inc., 540 U.S. at 409 (“The unilateral termination of a 
voluntary [and thus presumably profitable] course of dealing suggested a willingness to 
forsake short-term profits to achieve an anticompetitive end.”); Jefferson Parish Hosp. 
Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 11-12 (1984), superseded by statute on other grounds, Act 
of Nov. 19, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-703, §201, 102 Stat. 4674, 4676 (codified at   35 U.S.C. § 
271(d) (2006)), as recognized in Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 
(2006). 
 66. E. I. du Pont de Nemours, 351 U.S. at 391. 
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set by non-biased market dynamics (primarily supply and demand).  
Simply put, if one can eliminate competitors one can better control 
price.  In this section we examine how to establish an ability to control 
price when one controls a pricing benchmark.  The primary evidence 
used to establish an ability to control price comes from two main 
sources: first, direct evidence of actual price control and, second, 
evidence of market power. 
 
i. Direct Evidence 
 
Evidence of monopoly power may be established through direct 
evidence of actual price control.67  As discussed below, this method 
of establishing monopoly power is prevalent in benchmark antitrust 
litigation.  Basically, direct evidence of price control requires 
defendant(s) to have actually raised or lowered price due to the 
anticompetitive conduct in question.  If direct evidence of price 
control exists, plaintiff’s evidentiary burden is lessened regarding the 
monopoly power prong, but there still needs to be some evidence of 
the relevant market.68  This, inevitably leads to the question: what 
 
 67. Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 477-78; F.T.C. v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 
460-61 (1986); Paramount Media Group, Inc. v. Village of Bellwood, 929 F.3d 914, 922 (7th 
Cir., 2019); Wacker v. JP Morgan Chase & Co, 678 Fed.Appx 27, 30 -31(2d Cir. 2017); Mylan 
Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Public Limited Company, 838 F.3d 421, 434 (3d 
Cir. 2016); Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 307 (3d Cir. 2007); Harrison 
Aire, Inc. v. Aerostar Intern., Inc., 423 F.3d 374, 381 (3d Cir. 2005); Geneva Pharmaceuticals 
Technology Corp. v. Barr Laboratories Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 500 (2d Cir. 2004); Arani v. 
TriHealth Inc., 77 Fed.Appx. 823, 826 (6th Cir. 2003); Tops Mkts., Inc. v. Quality Mkts., 142 
F.3d 90, 98 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing K.M.B. Warehouse Distribs., Inc. v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 
F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir. 1995)); Heerwagen v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, 435 F.3d 219, 227 
(2d Cir. 2006); Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 500 (2d Cir. 
2004); PepsiCo v. Coca-Cola, 315 F.3d 101, 107 (2d Cir, 2002); Merced Irrigation District v. 
Barclays Bank PLC, 165 F.Supp.3d 122, 141-42 (U.S.D.C., S.D. N.Y., 2016); Todd v. Exxon 
Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 206 (2d Cir. 2001); Flegel v. Christian Hosp., 4 F.3d 682, 688 (8th Cir. 
1993); Re/Max Intern., Inc. v. Realty One, 173 F.3d 995, 1018-19 (6th Cir. 1999); Rebel Oil 
Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995), Greyhound Computer 
Corp., Inc. v. International Business Machines Corp., 559 F2d 488, 503-04 (9th Cir. 1977); 
2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ET AL., AREEDA & HOVENKAMP’S ANTITRUST LAW, 531a, 
at 156 (2002) (“AREEDA & HOVENKAMP”); John B. Kirkwood, Market Power and 
Antitrust Enforcement, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1169, 1195-96 (2018) (citing Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 
221 F.3d 928, 937 (7th Cir. 2000)). 
 68. Heerwagen v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, 435 F.3d 219, 229 (2d Cir. 2006); Merced 
Irrigation District, 165 F.Supp.3d at 141; Broadcom Corp., 501 F.3d at 307; Toys “R” Us, F.3d 
at 937 (“proof of actual detrimental effects, such as a reduction of output,” can obviate the 
need for an inquiry into market power, which is but a “surrogate for detrimental effects.”); 
Concord Assocs., 817 F.3d at 53; Republic Tobacco Co. v. N. Atl. Trading Co., 381 F.3d 717, 
737 (7th Cir. 2004);); Flegel, 4 F.3d at 688 (quoting Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 461); 
Re/Max Intern., Inc., 173 F.3d at 1018-19. 
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relevant market evidence is needed when one is relying on direct 
evidence of price control? 
As discussed below, when one is relying on circumstantial 
evidence of price control based upon market share analysis, there 
must be evidence of the product market including substitutes.  
Substitutes include sufficiently similar products where a consumer 
will change from the product in question to a substitute if there is a 
small but significant, non-transitory increase in price (SSNIP).69  The 
inclusion of substitutes reduces market share, thus reducing 
plaintiff’s probability of success in establishing an antitrust claim.  
But, with direct evidence, evidence of substitutes or the lack thereof 
is not necessary thus reducing plaintiff’s evidentiary burden and, 
potentially, increasing the chance of success in establishing the 
monopoly power prong.70 
 
ii. Benchmark Cases Applying Direct Evidence 
 
While direct evidence of monopoly power is rare,71 it is 
ubiquitous in antitrust benchmark cases.  This is so because in non-
benchmark cases, the direct evidence plaintiffs must produce 
includes evidence of supracompetitive pricing and restricted output 
or significant barriers to entry.72  This creates a difficult evidentiary 
burden for plaintiffs in the non-benchmark, direct evidence cases.  
The cases discussed below provide examples of direct evidence in 
pricing benchmark cases relevant to the issue of monopoly power as 
the ability to control prices. 
In Shak v. JPMorgan Chase & Co.,73 plaintiffs alleged a Sherman §2 
violation pleading direct evidence of monopoly power over the silver 
futures market.  Here, defendants are alleged to have manipulated 
the price by making large, uneconomic, spread bids and offers which 
would influence the futures contracts benchmark in favor of 
defendant.74  Of note, it was also alleged that defendant had a 
“dominate” market position in certain spread contracts relating to the 
 
 69. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, U.S. Dept. Justice and Federal Trade Commission, § 
4.1 (Aug. 19, 2010). 
 70. Heerwagen, 435 F.3d at 229; In re: Zinc Antitrust Litigation, 2016 WL 3167192. 
 71. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., 838 F.3d at 434. 
 72. Harrison Aire, Inc., 423 F.3d at 381; Broadcom Corp., 501 F.3d at 307; Id., at 434. 
 73. Shak v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 156 F.Supp.3d 462 (S.D.N.Y., 2016). 
 74. Id. at 470. 
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silver futures market, but a detailed, market share analysis was not 
required.75 
In Wacker v. JP Morgan Chase & Co,76 plaintiffs adequately alleged 
monopoly power under a direct evidence standard by pleading 
control of long-dated silver futures contracts where defendants 
manipulated silver benchmarks.77 
In Merced Irrigation District v. Barclays Bank PLC,78 Merced alleged 
that Barclays manipulated an electricity price benchmark, the 
Intercontinental Exchange (“ICE”) which directly affected the Dow 
Jones Daily Index price for peak power at the Northern California 
trading hub known as North Path 15.  This was price manipulation 
causing prices to go up or down depending on Barclay’s trading 
position.  The relevant Dow Jones Daily Index in this case was based 
upon index prices published by ICE which was based upon a 
weighted average price of all day-ahead fixed-price physical 
electricity transactions at the relevant location.  Merced bought peak 
power electricity at the North Path 15, a northern California trading 
hub.  Merced alleged a Sherman §2 violation as the Barclays 
manipulation of the ICE benchmark amounted to control of electricity 
prices in the Northern California North Path 15 geographic area.  This 
was sufficient to plead monopoly power by alleging direct evidence 
of the ability to control a pricing benchmark. 
In re Term Commodities Cotton Futures Litig.,79 is another Sherman 
§2 direct evidence case where futures prices for cotton were 
manipulated upwards to the benefit of defendant and showing an 
ability to control price without a detailed market share analysis.  
However, it was alleged that defendant controlled 99% of the relevant 
market, which is a sufficient market share to establish price control. 
In re Crude Oil Commodity Futures Litig.,80 involved Sherman § 2 
claims stemming from an alleged scheme to manipulate futures 
prices for West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil. Plaintiffs alleged 
that defendants acquired a substantial long position, acquired a 
dominant position (roughly 92%) in physical WTI crude oil thereby 
driving up the price, acquired a substantial short position and 
liquidated its physical WTI position on a date benefitting defendants’ 
 
 75. Id. at 484-90. 
 76. Wacker, 678 Fed.Appx at 30-31. 
 77. Id. 
 78. 165 F.Supp.3d at 128-30. 
 79. In re Term Commodities Cotton Futures Litig., No. 12 Civ. 5126, 2013 WL 9815198. 
 80. In re Crude Oil Commodity Futures Litig, 913 F.Supp.2d 41, 46-53 (S.D.N.Y.2012). 
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calendar spread positions.  While there was market power due to 
market share, it was in a different market – the physical WTI crude 
market.  That would allow control of the pricing benchmark for 
another market – the futures market. 
In re: Zinc Antitrust Litigation81 alleged a Sherman §2 violation 
based upon direct evidence of monopoly power.  Here, plaintiffs 
alleged defendants controlled the price of SHG zinc in the United 
States because they controlled 90% of LME warehouse storage, a 
component of SHG zinc price.82  This is not a benchmark nor a 
manipulation case, rather, it is important as an example of control 
over a price input, like storage costs, is sufficient to show control of 
price.83 
As many of the cases above indicate, it is not necessary to 
“corner” a market or achieve a significant market share to control 
price in a market where price is set by a benchmark; it is only 
necessary to control the benchmark data inputs.84  Control of a pricing 
benchmark is not only easier than obtaining a significant market 
share, it is a market reality. 
 
iii. Market Share 
 
In the absence of direct evidence of monopoly power, courts will 
infer monopoly power based upon market power which is 
determined by market share.85  Market share is ascertained by 
identifying the product market within a specified geographic area 
(geographic market).86  If the market share reaches a certain level, 
courts will infer market power, an indication of monopoly power.87  
While the market share analysis is more prevalent as evidence of 
 
 81. In re: Zinc Antitrust Litigation, 2016 WL 3167192, at 2. 
 82. Id. at 15. 
 83. Id. at 17. 
 84. Fletcher, supra note 26, at 1931 -32; Verstein, supra note 24, at, 218, 224-25, 
241(indicating that the ability to strategically feed or starve the transactional benchmark 
of transactional data gives transactors outsized influence. 
 85. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION 
AND ITS PRACTICE 272-73 (3d ed. 2005); Sharon E. Foster, Systemic Financial-Service 
Institutions and Monopoly Power, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 357, 375 (2011). 
 86. Foster, supra note 85, at 375; HOVENKAMP, supra note 85, at 83. 
 87. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 85, at 272-73 (“Monopoly power” and “market 
power” are terms that appear to be used interchangeably by courts and commentators.) 
(using the terms “monopoly power” and “market power” interchangeably); Foster, supra 
note 85, at 375. 
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monopoly power, it is recognized that such analysis is, at best, an 
imperfect substitute for direct evidence.88 
a. Market Share and Monopoly Power 
To apply a market-share analysis, the product market and 
geographic market must be defined.  This seemingly simple task is, 
in reality, extremely complicated.  It turns on not only identifying the 
specific product in question, but also any substitutes which 
consumers may turn to if the price of the product in question goes up 
in a particular geographic location. 
ai. Product Market 
The product market is the good, intangible or service over which 
the monopolist is alleged to have control over price or to have 
eliminated competitors offering the same or a similar good, intangible 
or service.  For example, in Merced the product was electricity.  
However, this product definition could be broader if it can be 
established that consumers will turn to a substitute product, perhaps 
natural gas, if the price of electricity increased. 89  The test courts will 
use in an antitrust case is: if there is a small but significant, non-
transitory increase in price (SSNIP) causing a consumer to switch to 
another product, that other product is a substitute. 90  In such a case, 
the original product is considered elastic as replacement by a 
substitute is likely.  The product market must then be defined to 
include the substitute.  This will usually result in the alleged 
monopolist having a smaller market share. 91  Conversely, if 
consumers do not have the option to turn to a substitute, the product 
 
 88. Lawrence A. Sullivan, Economics and More Humanistic Disciplines: What Are the 
Sources of Wisdom for Antitrust, 125 U. PA.L. REV. 1214, 1220-21; See William M. Landes & 
Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 
947(1981)(explaining that “influence of market demand and supply elasticity on market 
power” should be considered under a market-share analysis); Foster, supra note 85, at 375-
76; WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & JANUSZ A. ORDOVER, ANTITRUST: SOURCE OF 
DYNAMIC AND STATIC INEFFICIENCIEST, IN ANTITRUST INNOVATION, AND 
COMPETITIVENESS 82, 83 (Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece eds., 1992); Richard S. 
Markovits, The American Antitrust Laws on the Centennial of the Sherman Act: A Critique of 
the Statutes Themselves. Their Interpretation, and Their Operationalization, 38 BUFF. L. REV. 673, 
743-44 (1990) (asserting that a market-share approach reflects neither the company’s 
theoretical nor actual monopoly power in a given market). 
 89. Landes & Posner, supra note 88, at 945; Foster, supra note 85, at 376. 
 90. See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 351 U.S. at 404 (noting that, although the 
defendant may have monopolized the cellophane business, other types of plastic 
wrapping provided competition and interchangeability); Foster, supra note 85, at 377. 
 91. See Landes & Posner, supra note 88, at 947-51 (Other situations affecting the 
elasticity of a demand curve include when competitors do not operate at capacity and 
when the industry is not costly to enter); Foster, supra note 85, at 376-77. 
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is considered inelastic and the alleged monopolist will likely have a 
larger market share. 
To add a further wrinkle to the analysis, there may be a 
submarket within the broader product market definition which 
would narrow the market resulting in an increase in market share. 92  
Again, using the Merced facts as an example, there the product 
market, electricity, was further narrowed to a submarket; peak power 
electricity.  The test courts use to determine if a submarket exists 
examines indicia factors such as: “industry or public recognition of 
the submarket as a separate economic entity, the product’s peculiar 
characteristics and uses, unique production facilities, distinct 
customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes, and 
specialized vendors.”93  It is important to note that some, but not all, 
of the indicia factors need to be present.94  Further, there is no 
authority for the proposition that these indicia factors constitute an 
exhaustive list. 
Despite the detailed analysis courts and parties must engage in 
to define the product market using a market share analysis, most 
commentators agree that defining the product market by the market 
share analysis is an imperfect science.95  This is so because courts may 
find an ill-defined product market by expanding the product market 
to include substitutes resulting in insufficient market share to 
establish monopoly power (a false negative) or contracting the 
product market by excluding substitutes resulting in sufficient 
market share to establish monopoly power (a false positive). 
aii. Geographic Market 
In order to determine market share, it is also necessary to define 
the geographic market.  Again, using the Merced case as an example, 
 
 92. FTC v. Staples, 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1075 (D.D.C. 1997). 
 93. Id. (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962)). 
 94. Id. 
 95. ERNEST GELLHORN ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS: IN A NUTSHELL 188-
222 (5th ed. 2004) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s analysis in E.I. du Pont de Nemours 
& Co. is incorrect because high cross-elasticity indicates low market power only when 
competitors offer comparable prices for the same product); RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 127-28 (1976) (explaining that the E.I. du 
Pont de Nemours & Co. market-share analysis erroneously ignored substitution in 
production and failed to specify the price for which products in a given market could be 
considered interchangeable); see generally Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Policy and the 
Cellophane Case, 70 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1956) (describing E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. 
and arguing that the alleged monopolist should carry the burden of proving that 
competitors in the market offer equally comparable products); Foster, supra note 85, at 377, 
379; See IIB PHILLIP AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW para. 533c, at 254-57 (3d ed. 2007) (For 
a discussion on the criticism of using submarket analysis). 
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the geographic market was the Northern California trading hub 
known as North Path 15.96  The geographic market is “defined as the 
area where a [alleged] monopolist could effectively control prices.”97  
This may be where the alleged monopolist conducts business or 
competes but, given economic realities98 and technology, the focus is 
on where the “effect . . . on competition will be direct and immediate 
. . .”99 
The current economic reality, particularly in the financial 
services industry, is that many businesses conduct their business, 
such that the effect of their conduct will be direct and immediate, in 
a national and even global geographic market.100  This expansion of 
the geographic market from local, to national, to global usually has 
the effect of reducing market share.101  However, in certain pricing 
benchmark antitrust litigation, the pricing benchmark only effects a 
specific geographic market, thus potentially increasing market share. 
For example, in the Merced case, it was alleged that Barclays 
controlled, through manipulation, ICE which directly affected the 
Dow Jones Daily Index price for peak power at the Northern 
California trading hub known as North Path 15.  Accordingly, while 
one could argue that the relevant geographic market could be 
global,102 in the electricity market, business is conducted in local or 
regional markets, and control of various electricity benchmarks 
 
 96. Merced Irrigation District, 165 F.Supp.3d at 128-30. 
 97. Tim McCarthy, Refining Product Market Definition in the Antitrust Analysis of Bank 
Mergers, 46 DUKE L.J. 865, 867-68 (1997); Foster, supra note 85, at 380. 
 98. United States v. Conn. Nat’l Bank, 418 U.S. 656, 662 (1974) (The Supreme Court 
recognized that precedent does not require courts to be “blind ... to economic realities.”); 
Foster, supra note 85, at 381. 
 99. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 356-59 (quoting CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, 
ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 102 (1959)); Foster, supra note 85, 
at 380. 
 100. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 575-76 (1966) (noting that the 
geographic area of the entity at issue was national and that it engaged in “national 
planning”); Carl Felsenfeld, Panel Discussion I: Development of Bank Mergers Law, 13 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 511, 526-27 (2008) (discussing the large and expanding 
geographic market for many business); Edward Pekarek & Michela Huth, Bank Merger 
Reform Takes an Extended Philadelphia National Bank Holiday, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 
595, 631-36 (2008)  631-36 (discussing how financial services are no longer confined to a 
determinate industry); United States v. Mcrosoft, 253 F.3d 34, 52 (2001); Foster, supra note 
85, at 381. 
 101. Carl Felsenfeld, Panel Discussion I: Development of Bank Mergers Law, 13 FORDHAM 
J. CORP. & FIN. L. 511, 527 (2008) (discussing how redefining a global market creates levels 
of commercial-bank concentration that would fall below that which antitrust laws are 
aimed to prevent); Foster, supra note 85, at 375. 
 102. See https://www.theice.com/about. 
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directly affects markets that are geographically more local or regional 
in nature.103  Therefore, the defined geographic market was the 
Northern California trading hub known as North Path 15, a smaller 
geographic area and, thus, higher market share if indirect, market 
share evidence was used. 
 
iv. Duration Of Control Over Prices 
 
The conventional wisdom is that monopoly power needs to have 
long-lasting effects on price; not merely ephemeral effects.104  The 
theory behind this monopoly power requirement is that markets with 
low barriers to entry will not sustain monopolization for the long 
term as competitors will “come to the monopoly” to seek high 
profits.105  In essence, the market will self-correct without the need for 
intervention by the government or private actions through antitrust 
laws. 
The problem with the duration requirement for monopoly 
power is multifold: first, courts have not clearly articulated any time 
period.  What is a sufficient time period?  One month? One year?  Ten 
years?  We are left to speculate.  Second, should a time period for one 
market apply to different markets?  For example, if we require a five-
year time period in the market for beer, should we require a five-year 
time period in a financial market pricing benchmark such as LIBOR?  
Is the damage to markets, to the economy, to political stability and to 
 
 103. See U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy 
Reliability, United States Electricity Industry Primer, 24-30 (2015), 
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/12/f28/united-states-electricity-
industry-primer.pdf; S&P Global Platts, Methodology and specifications guide M2MS – 
Power methodology (May 2018), 
https://www.spglobal.com/platts/plattscontent/_assets/_files/en/our-
methodology/methodology-specifications/m2ms_power_methodology.pdf. 
 104. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589-90 (1986); 
Shaun D. Ledgerwood, James A. Keyte, Jeremy A. Verlinda, Guy Ben-Ishai, The 
Intersection of Market Manipulation Law and Monopolization Under The Sherman Act: Does it 
Make Economic Sense?, 40 ENERGY L. J. 47, 50 , 57-59, 79(2019); Colorado Interstate Gas Co. 
v. Nat. Gas Pipeline Co, 885 F.2d 683, 695-96 (10th Cir. 1989); Carpenter Tech Corp., 2011 
WL 4528303 at *6; See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 67, at 323; Rio Grande 
Royalty Co, Inc. v. Energy Transfer Partners, 786 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (2009); U.S. v. Syufy 
Enterprises, 903 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1990) (even with 100% market share, there can be no 
monopoly power if entry barriers are low); Emrigra Group v. Fragomen, Del Ray Bernson 
& Lowey, 612 F. Supp. 2d. 330, 362 (2009) (“market power can only persist when entry 
barrier ... block rivals’ entry or expansion.”). 
 105. See Ledgerwood & Keyte, supra note 104, at 80-81. 
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individuals the same?  And third, should economic consequences 
replace or supplement the duration requirement? 
We have some examples of sufficient duration, particularly in 
the pricing benchmark manipulation cases.  For example, in Merced 
“[t]he Complaint incorporates the FERC Report’s conclusions that 
Barclays manipulated the ICE Daily Index Prices during 655 product 
days over 35 product months.”106  Further, Merced’s complaint 
provided “a detailed breakdown of Barclays’s trading by month, 
trading hub, product, and price. It shows the number of days during 
each month that Barclays benefited from its alleged manipulative 
trades: during 27 out of 35 product months in which Barclays is 
alleged to have engaged in manipulative trades, the number of days 
in which it benefited was greater than 25.”107 
To summarize, in Merced, Barclays is alleged to have 
manipulated the relevant pricing benchmark for a period of 
approximately three years.108  This was held to be sufficient to show 
defendant’s control over prices was not ephemeral.109 
However, in Rio Grande Royalty Co, Inc. v. Energy Transfer 
Partners, L.P.,110 defendants allegedly manipulated the Houston 
Shipping Channel (“HSC”) index, a pricing benchmark for natural 
gas for a two-year period.  Plaintiffs’ alleged Defendants’ controlled 
prices through the benchmark manipulation for sales of fixed-price 
natural gas during bidweek which is the last week of the month.  Out 
of a 24-month period, Plaintiffs alleged 10 times that defendants were 
able to manipulate the benchmark.  The court found that this was 
insufficient to establish sustained monopoly power.111 
While pricing benchmark control does not always establish 
sufficient duration as evidenced by the Rio Grande case, it is clear that 
numerous benchmark manipulation cases establish significant 
duration control.112  This is so because benchmark manipulators are 
 
 106. Merced Irrigation District, 165 F. Supp. 3d at 128-30. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 128, 142. 
 109. Id. at 128, 143; see also, In re Commodity Exchange, Inc., Gold Futures, 2017 WL 
9480384 (U.S.D.C., S.D.N.Y.) (discussing the fixing period as 2004 through 2012 [at p. 2-3] 
for fixing the gold prices by fixing the benchmark). 
 110. Rio Grande Royalty Co, v. Energy Transfer Partners, 786 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (S.D. 
Tx. 2009). 
 111. Id. at 1213. 
 112. Merced Irrigation Dist. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 165 F. Supp. 3d 122, 128, 143 (S.D. 
N.Y. 2016). Some Sherman § 1 benchmark manipulation cases may be helpful in duration 
of price control issues. See Sharon E. Foster, Libor Manipulation and Antitrust Allegations, 11 
DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 291, 299 (2013); Sonterra Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. Barclays 
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often providing the input data upon which the benchmark relies.  
Absent significant oversight, it may take years to detect.  This 
problem of detection is further complicated by the common 
benchmark manipulation practice of on-again-off-again 
manipulation.  In essence, benchmark manipulation does not have to 
be a daily occurrence to be successful.113 
 
B. WILLFUL ACQUISITION OR MAINTENANCE – THE CONDUCT PRONG 
 
The “willful acquisition or maintenance” or “conduct prong” has 
variously been described as “exclusionary,” “predatory,” and 
“anticompetitive.”114  It prohibits “both concerted and unilateral 
behavior” that threatens actual monopolization.115  Numerous cases 
where the allegations included benchmark manipulation have 
satisfied the conduct prong.116 
Manipulation of pricing benchmarks distort free market supply 
and demand pricing mechanisms.117  This has been alleged to be 
 
Bank PLC, 366 F. Supp. 3d 516, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (LIBOR benchmark manipulated over 
five years); In re Commodity Exch., Inc., Gold Futures and Options Trading Litigation, 
2017 WL 9480384 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2017) (plaintiffs alleged defendants fixed the pricing 
benchmark for physical gold and gold-denominated financial instruments for about eight 
years); Second Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint at ¶6, In re Foreign Exch. 
Benchmark Rates Antitrust Litig., 2015 WL 5924387 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2015) (the foreign 
exchange benchmarks, FOREX manipulated approximately for ten years); Order 
Instituting Proceedings Pursuant to Sections 6(c) and 6(d) of the Commodity Exchange 
Act, Making Findings, and Imposing Remedial Sanctions, CFTC No. 17-03, Comm. Fut. L. 
Rep. (Dec. 21, 2016). 
 113. Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Benchmark Regulation, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1929, 1960 (2017). 
 114. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 451 (2009); Brooke 
Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222-24 (1993); Aspen 
Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 602-03; Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 
328, 340 (1990); Sharon E. Foster, Systemic Financial-Service Institutions and Monopoly Power, 
60 CATH. U. L. REV.  357, 384-85 (2011). 
 115. Merced Irrigation Dist., 165 F. Supp. 3d at 140 (citing Copperweld Corp. v. 
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 n. 13 (1984)). 
 116. Wacker v. JP Morgan Chase & Co, 678 Fed. Appx. 27, 30-31(2nd Cir. 2017); 
Merced Irrigation Dist., 165 F. Supp. 3d at 128-30; In re Term Commodities Cotton Futures 
Litig., No. 12 Civ. 5126(ALC)(KNF), 2013 WL 9815198, at *24 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2013); In 
re Crude Oil Commodity Futures Litig., 913 F. Supp. 2d 41, 46-53 (S.D.N.Y.2012); In re: 
Zinc Antitrust Litigation, 2016 WL 3167192, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2016). 
 117. See Merced Irrigation Dist., 165 F. Supp. 3d at 130 (“Those prices would be either 
artificially high, if Barclays held a “long” swap contract as a buyer and bought a high 
volume of daily contracts at inflated prices to raise the index price, or artificially low, if 
Barclays held a “short” swap contract as a seller and sold daily contracts at less-than-
market prices to drive down the index price on the settlement date.”) 
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anticompetitive118 and constitutes market abuse. 119  It also violates a 
main goal of antitrust law – to protect free markets.120  Further, 
“[c]onduct may be characterized as exclusionary if it “does not 
further competition on the merits or does so in an unnecessarily 
restrictive way.”121  Manipulation of the pricing benchmark 
artificially inflates or deflates prices such as to constitute exclusionary 
and anticompetitive conduct.122  However, courts are reluctant to find 
an antitrust violation because of the fear of “false positives” which 
may undermine “incentive to innovate.”123  Accordingly, the conduct 
prong looks to “willful acquisition or maintenance of [monopoly] 
power as distinguished from growth or development as a 
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic 
accident.”124 
In  In re Cotton Futures, the complaint alleged manipulation 
consisting of an  “interconnected series of uneconomic steps [and] 
highly unusual steps . . . contrary to the customs and practices of 
cotton market participants.”125  Further, in In re Crude Oil, it was found 
that the manipulation conduct had  “no rational business purpose 
other than its adverse effects on competitors.”126  In In re: Zinc, the 
manipulation included fraudulent conduct to control warehouse 
prices so as to control SHG zinc prices which met the conduct 
prong.127  Simply put, manipulation of pricing benchmarks is 
 
 118. Id. 
 119. Andrew Verstein, Benchmark Manipulation, 56 B.C. L. REV., 215, 219 (2015). 
 120. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 408 (1978); United 
States v. Topco Assocs, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972); Southern Motor Carriers Rate 
Conference, Inc. v. U.S., 471 U.S. 48, 62 (1985); City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., 
Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 388 (1991); Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260, 281 (1986) (citing to 
Cmty. Commc’ns Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 56 (1982)); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 
U.S. 558, 599 (1984) (citing to Cmty. Commc’ns Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 56 
(1982)); Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C. L. REV., 551, 560-62 
(2012). 
 121. Merced Irrigation Dist., 165 F. Supp. 3d at 128 (citing to Meredith Corp. v. SESAC, 
LLC, 1 F. Supp. 3d 180, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) and Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands 
Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 (1985)). 
 122. Merced Irrigation Dist., 165 F. Supp. 3d at 128-30. 
 123. See Shak v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 156 F. Supp. 3d 462, 484-90 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) 
(citing to Verizon Commc’ns v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 
(2004). 
 124. Id. (citing PepsiCo, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 315 F.3d 101, 105 (quoting United States 
v. Grinnell, 384 U.S. 563, 570-71)). 
 125. In re Term Commodities Cotton Futures Litig., No. 12 Civ. 5126(ALC)(KNF), 2013 
WL 9815198, at *24-25 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2013). 
 126. In re Crude Oil Commodity Futures Litig., 913 F. Supp. 2d 41, 56 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 127. In re: Zinc Antitrust Litigation, 2016 WL 3167192, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2016). 
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anticompetitive.128  However, if the conduct of alleged manipulation 
requires speculation that the conduct is uneconomic and does not 
establish anticompetitive knowledge and intent, the monopolization 
claim will fail.129 
 
VII. BENCHMARK REFORM 
 
This section’s focus is on Inter-bank Offered Rate (“IBOR”) 
benchmark reform as it proposes a possible change from private, 
third-party input providers and administrators to government input 
providers and administrators.  Other benchmarks, such as the ForEx 
benchmark, propose to maintain private input providers and 
administrators but enhance oversight and transparency.130  In 
response to the LIBOR131 benchmark manipulation revelations, both 
international and domestic regulators moved to investigate and 
implement reforms to restore faith in market prices which had 
become totally dependent on benchmarks for pricing purposes.  One 
of the first reports addressing this issue came out of the United 
Kingdom in the Wheatley Review (September 2012) addressing the 
manipulation of the LIBOR benchmarks.132  The Wheatley Review 
recommended reform of LIBOR not replacement.133  Reform included 
verifying submissions against transaction data134 and limiting the 
publication of LIBOR to those currencies and tenors that are 
supported by sufficient transaction data.135  It also proposed that 
market participants should continue to play a significant role in the 
production and oversight of LIBOR.136  Further, the Wheatley Review 
required replacing the administrator of LIBOR, the British Bankers 
Association, a trade association made-up of members in the financial 
 
 128. Sonterra Capital Master Fund Ltd. v. Credit Suisse Group AG, 277 F. Supp. 3d 
521, 552 (2017) (citing Gelboim v. Bank of America, 823 F.3d 759 (2d Cir. 2016)). 
 129. Shak, 156 F. Supp. 3d at 484-90. 
 130. See, e.g., INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, SECOND REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION 
OF IOSCO’S PRINCIPLES FOR FINANCIAL BENCHMARKS IN RESPECT OF THE WM/REUTERS 4 
P.M. CLOSING SPOT RATE (2017). 
 131. LIBOR is an Inter-bank Offered Rate (“IBOR”). 
 132. THE WHEATLEY REVIEW OF LIBOR: FINAL REPORT (2012), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attac
hment_data/file/191762/wheatley_review_libor_finalreport_280912.pdf. 
 133. Id. at 7. 
 134. Id. at 11-13. 
 135. Id. at 7. 
 136. Id. 
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services industry, with the Financial Services Authority, a state 
regulatory authority.137 
In 2014, the Financial Stability Board (“FSB”), an international 
body that makes recommendations regarding the global financial 
services industry,138 made recommendations regarding the issue of 
IBOR benchmarks, like LIBOR.  These recommendations included: 
• strengthening of IBORs by anchoring them to a greater number 
of transactions, where possible, and improving the processes and 
controls around submissions; 
• identifying alternative near-risk-free rates (RFRs) and, where 
suitable, encouraging market participants to transition new contracts 
to an appropriate RFR. 139 
According to a December 18, 2019 Progress Report, IBOR 
reforms are progressing, but not yet implemented: 
Since 2014, the work has been coordinated at the international 
level by the FSB’s Official Sector Steering Group (OSSG). 
In July 2016 the OSSG formally launched a third major initiative, 
to improve contract robustness to address risks of discontinuation of 
widely-used interest rate benchmarks. The OSSG invited ISDA 
[International Swaps and Derivatives Association] to lead this work 
as it pertained to derivative contracts, which are the largest source of 
exposure to the IBORs. ISDA welcomed that invitation and has 
undertaken a significant programme of work in response. 
Although all of the major IBORs have been strengthened since 
the OSSG was formed, FSB member authorities in certain 
jurisdictions have moved away from their original view that a 
“multiple-rate” approach, in which each IBOR could be made to be 
sustainable and potentially coexist with the RFR, was possible. 
In particular, authorities have warned that there is an 
appreciable risk that LIBOR will end once official sector support for 
the benchmark ends at end-2021. There is also the risk that LIBOR 
could be found to no longer be representative of the underlying 
market it purports to measure, due to a lack of underlying 
transactions. This would have consequences for users covered by the 
 
 137. Id. at 11-12. As of April 2013, the Financial Services Authority has been replaced 
by the he Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority. 
 138. ABOUT THE FSB, FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, https://www.fsb.org/about/ (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2021). 
 139. FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, REFORMING MAJOR INTEREST RATE BENCHMARKS, 
PROGRESS REPORT 4 (Dec. 18, 2019), https://www.fsb.org/wp-
content/uploads/P181219.pdf. 
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EU Benchmarks Regulation (BMR). As the UK authorities have stated 
they will not compel panel banks to participate in LIBOR panels after 
end-2021, FSB member authorities consider that transition away from 
LIBOR is necessary, across the five LIBOR currencies (USD, EUR, JPY, 
GBP and CHF). Transition well before that date would greatly 
minimise risks to financial stability.140 
The Bank for International Settlements (“BIS”), an international 
organization of central bankers established to promote monetary and 
financial stability,141 recently stated that it is possible that multiple 
rates benchmarks may be necessary for the foreseeable future.142  One 
problem is that the alternative benchmarks, risk-free rates (“RFR”) do 
not provide 
a close match to their marginal funding costs.143  This would 
indicate that IBORs, such as LIBOR, may be reformed but not 
replaced. 
The United States’ RFR LIBOR replacement is the Secured 
Overnight Financing Rate (“SOFR”).  SOFR is based on the Treasury 
repurchase (“repo”) market.  In general, the data input for SOFR is 
derived from “all trades in the Broad General Collateral Rate144 plus 
bilateral Treasury repurchase agreement (repo) transactions cleared 
through the Delivery-versus-Payment145 (DVP) service offered by the 
Fixed Income Clearing Corporation (FICC), a subsidiary of the 
Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation [a corporation providing 
services to the financial services sector] which is filtered to remove a 
 
 140. Id. 
 141. ABOUT BIS – OVERVIEW, BIS, https://www.bis.org/about/index.htm?m=1%7C1 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2021). 
 142. Andreas Schrimpf & Vladyslav Sushko, Beyond LIBOR: A Primer on the New 
Benchmark Rates, BIS Q. REV. 29 (2019). 
 143. Id. at 30. 
 144. “The Broad General Collateral Rate (BGCR) is a measure of rates on overnight 
Treasury general collateral repurchase agreement (repo) transactions.” Broad General 
Collateral Rate Data, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, 
https://apps.newyorkfed.org/markets/autorates/bgcr (last visited Mar. 3, 2021). 
Basically, collateralized, overnight borrowing rates. 
 145. “Delivery versus payment (DVP) is a securities industry settlement method that 
guarantees the transfer of securities only happens after payment has been made. DVP 
stipulates that the buyer’s cash payment for securities must be made prior to or at the 
same time as the delivery of the security.” Alexandra Twin, Delivery Versus Payment 
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portion of transactions considered ‘specials.’”146  The data is collected 
by “DTCC Solutions LLC, an affiliate of the Depository Trust & 
Clearing Corporation.  Each business day, the New York Fed 
publishes the SOFR on the New York Fed website at approximately 
8:00 a.m. ET.”147  The data is then calculated “as a volume-weighted 
median of transaction-level tri-party repo data”148  While the New 
York Fed is an administrator and producer of SOFR,149 the Depository 
Trust & Clearing Corporation, a non-governmental entity, provides 
some data input and administrative services as well.  Accordingly, 
the administrator of SOFR appears to be a combined 
government/private sector data input provider and administrator. 
Because SOFR is produced, at least in-part, by the New York Fed, 
a governmental agency, it is believed that the benchmark will be 
based on larger data input, more transparent and less susceptible to 
manipulation.150  However, this is not necessarily the case.  A little 
history here is helpful to understand why IBOR’s were used in the 
first place: 
Prior to the ubiquitous use of LIBOR as an interest rate 
benchmark, other benchmarks were used more frequently like the 
Prime Rate based upon the Federal Reserve’s Discount Rate in the 
United States, which is the rate of interest the Federal Reserve charges 
banks to borrow funds.  However, during the economic instability of 
the 1970s, inflation caused unacceptable fluctuations in interest rates 
creating concern about the stability and predictability of a central 
bank benchmark for interest rates, such as the Federal Reserve’s rate 
in the United States.  Additionally, questions were raised about the 
use of a regulator’s (again like the Federal Reserve, which is a banking 
regulator in the United States) interest rates for benchmarks with 
respect to whether it truly reflected market conditions or, rather, 
reflected political policy.”151 
 
 146. Secured Overnight Financing Rate Data, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, 
https://apps.newyorkfed.org/markets/autorates/sofr (last visited Mar. 3, 2021). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Lorie K. Logan, Senior Vice President, Fed. Reserve Bank of New York, The Role 
of the New York Fed as Administrator and Producer of Reference Rates (Jan. 9, 2018), 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2018/log180109. 
 150. David Bowman, Templates for Using SOFR, slide 2 (2019), 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/microsites/arrc/files/2019/Templates_fo
r_Using_SOFR.pdf. 
 151. Sharon E. Foster, Libor Manipulation and Antitrust Allegations, 11 DEPAUL BUS. & 
COM. L.J. 291, 297 (2013). 
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It is rather ironic that the LIBOR interest rate benchmark was 
adopted due to concerns about politicizing the markets and that the 
replacement to LIBOR goes back to, at least in part, a Fed rate during 
a time when the markets are highly politicized.  The Federal Reserve 
is currently intervening in the repo market due to liquidity 
concerns.152  While the Federal Reserve’s mission includes the 
promotion of financial stability,153 the tools it uses to achieve such 
stability includes market intervention – buying and selling in the 
market and providing low cost loans to financial institutions.154  
While such actions may promote financial stability, it bears no 
resemblance to a free market.  It is also doubtful that SOFR will 
eliminate the conflicts of interest problems identified during the 
LIBOR scandal.  Rather, it replaces the conflict of interest inherent in 
a benchmark system when end users of the benchmark are also input 
providers and/or administrators with a conflict of interest system 
prone to politicization where the market reflects political bias and 
favors; also known as crony capitalism.  Unfortunately, U.S. markets 
currently reflect such crony capitalism. 155  That said, if IBOR 
benchmarks are converted to SOFR, it seems less likely sufficient 
control over the benchmarks could be established to evidence 




 152. Jonnelle Marte, New York Fed Tweaks Repo Operations as Market Functioning 
Improves (June 11, 2020, 2:11 PM), REUTERS, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
fed-repo/new-york-fed-tweaks-repo-operations-as-market-functioning-improves-
idUSKBN23I39Z; Liz McCormick & Alex Harris, The Repo Market’s a Mess. (What’s the Repo 
Market?) (Sept. 28, 2019), WASHINGTON POST, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/the-repo-markets-a-mess-whats-the-repo-
market/2019/09/28/e8fd43b2-e1d8-11e9-be7f-4cc85017c36f_story.html. 
 153. FED. RESERVE, PROMOTING FINANCIAL SYSTEM STABILITY, 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/files/pf_4.pdf. 
 154. Id.; McCormick & Harris, supra note 152. 
 155. Craig Torres, Investors Clamor for the Fed to Slash Rates to Zero, BLOOMBERG (March 
12, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-13/fed-pressed-to-be-
hero-with-zero-interest-rates-as-trump-stalls; Ann Saphir & Jonnelle Marte, Fed Sees U.S. 
economy on Track, Trump Renews Fed Gripes, REUTERS (January 15, 2020, 10:26 AM) 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-fed/fed-sees-u-s-economy-on-track-trump-
renews-fed-gripes-idUSKBN1ZE2IW; Patti Domm, Federal Reserve Fends Off eEforts to be 
Politicized by President Trump, For Now, CNBC, MARKET INSIDER (May 2, 2019, 3:54 PM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/02/federal-reserve-fends-off-efforts-to-be-politicized-
by-president-trump-for-now.html; Jeanna Smialek, Trump Says He Could Demote Fed Chair 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
 
Financial benchmarks are important and necessary given 
enormous size and structure of financial markets.  Financial 
benchmarks can efficiently set price in these markets thus expediting 
commerce and investments.  However, financial benchmarks depend 
upon human factors such as data input providers, administrators and 
end users.  These three actors often overlap creating conflicts of 
interest and manipulation for self-interest. 
Because financial benchmarks are the de facto and at times de jure 
price for the related asset, financial benchmarks control price.  The 
ability to control price is a critical element of a monopolization claim.  
However, the mere ability to control price is not sufficient; defendants 
in a monopolization case must control price in an anticompetitive 
manner, such as by manipulating a financial benchmark for self-
interest. 
Many financial benchmark cases have established financial 
benchmark manipulation in general and monopolization in 
particular.  Reforms are ongoing to reduce such private party 
manipulation by inserting governmental participation and oversight.  
Unfortunately, we live in times where government intervention in 
financial benchmark oversight may not lead to credibility in financial 
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